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In this paper the theory of explicit definability is treated under the 
.scope of the theory of models. The theorem of PADOA (1900) 2) and the 
theorem of BETH (1953) 3) form the basis of theorem 1, which gives a 
full characterization of the notion of explicit definability in terms of 
models (1959) 4). A re-formulation of this theorem in theorem 2 sets the 
subject of explicit definability clearly as a topic of the theory of models 
in the strict sense, i.e., the study of relationships between sentences or 
.sets of sentences together with the corresponding relationships between 
the classes of models of these sentences or sets of sentences. The theorem 
-of KEISLER (1961) 5) makes it possible to follow the suggestion of theorem 2 
and to characterize the notion of explicit definability in purely mathe-
matical terms, which is done in the definitions 3 and 4. The remainder 
-of the paper justifies the given definitions. 
The first point of departure of these considerations is a standard language, 
i.e., a formal language of first-order predicate logic with identity, without 
variable predicates. A standard language being fixed by its non-logical 
·constants, we give the language 2, of which the only non-logical con-
stants are a finite number of predicates ro, r1. ... , rn-1. rn with ranks 
eo, el, ... , en-1. en respectively. 
2 defines a similarity class, Sf(2), of relational systems 6), each of 
which is a model suited to the language 2. If M E Sf(2), then M is a 
.system (A, ro, r1. ... , rn-1, rn), where A is a non-empty set 7) and for 
each i, O.;;;i.;;;n, rt is a et-ary relation in A. 
1 ) Text of an address given at Utrecht, on November lOth, 1962, to the Nether-
lands Society for Logic and Philosophy of the Exact Sciences. The paper was pre-
pared at the University of Amsterdam under Euratom Contract no. 010-60-12. 
2) Cf. [7], pp. 321, 322. Numbers in square brackets refer to References. 
3) Cf. [1], pp. 330 ff. Also [2], pp. 29 ff. 
4) Cf. [4], p. 4. 
5) Cf. [6], pp. 477 ff. 
&) The terminology of the theory of models used here is mainly taken from the 
works of A. TARSKI, more specifically from [9], [10] and [11]. 
7) The phrase a model suited to the language !l' is taken from D. KALISH and 
R. MoNTAGUE in [5]. However, in this paper we avoid to speak of the so-called 
.empty model in order not to disturb the main line of thought with details. 
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Let ME Sf(2), let E be the set of all sentences of 2 and let r hE. 
We say that M is a model of r if, and only if, every a E r is true in M. 
Let 2 o be the language obtained from 2 by dropping the predicate r11 • 
A sentence 15 E E is called an explicit definition of rn in 2 if, and only 
if, 15 has the shape: 
(x1) ... (xe,.)(rn(Xl, ... , Xe,.) ~ q;), 
where cp is a formula of 2o containing no other free variables than the 
distinct variables x1, ... , Xe,.· It will be clear that the concept of explicit 
definition is a purely syntactical notion. 
Let F h E be closed under logical deduction, or what amounts to the 
same thing, let r be a (deductive) theory. The concept of a theory is a 
logical notion. The following definition is of a purely syntactical-logical 
nature: 
Definition 1: The predicate rn is definable explicitly and validly 
with respect to r if, and only if, there is some explicit definition 15 of rn 
in 2 SUCh that 15 E F. 
Let Eo be the set of all sentences of 2o and let Fo = r n Eo. Obviously, 
if r is a theory, then Fo is a theory also. It can be seen readily that rn 
is definable explicitly and validly with respect to r if, and only if, there 
is some explicit definition 15 of rn in 2 such that F= Fo l:J { 15}, where l:J 
denotes the logical union (i.e., F=Cn(Fo u {15}), or the closure under 
logical deduction of the set-theoretical union of Fo and { 15} ). Because of 
this remark it seems justified to apply the idea of definability to r itself 
in the following way: 
Definition 2: The theory r is definable explicitly and validly from 
the theory Fo if, and only if, the predicate rn is definable explicitly and 
validly with respect to r. 
The latter definition sets the theory of definability explicitly as a topic 
in the theory of models. Theory r being definable explicitly and validly 
from theory Fo concerns a relationship between sets of sentences. We 
know already how to characterize this relationship in terms of models 
of the theories in question. 
Let Mo=(A, ro, r1. ... , rn-1) be a model suited to the language 2o. 
If M =(A, ro, r1, ... , rn-b rn) is a model suited to the language 2, then 
we say that M is an enrichment of Mo with rn. We have the following 
theorem (1959) B): 
Theorem 1: For rn to be definable explicitly and validly with 
respect to r, it is necessary and sufficient that for any model M o of Fo 
there exists one, and only one, enrichment M of Mo with rn such that M 
is a model of r. 
s) Cf. [4], p. 4. 
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Because of definition 2 we can rewrite this theorem as: 
Theorem l': For T to be definable explicitly and validly from To 
it is necessary and sufficient that for any model Mo of To there exists 
one, and only one, enrichment M of Mo with rn such that M is a model 
ofT. 
Considering Sf(2), Sf(2"o) and the relation being an enrichment with rn, 
we can say the following: for each M E Sf(2) there is one, and only one, 
MoE Sf(2"o) such that M is an enrichment of Mo with rn. If 
M = (A,ro,r1, ... ,rn-1,r), then the corresponding Mo= (A,ro, r1, ... ,rn-1). On 
the other hand, for each MoE Sf(2"o) there are many elements of Sf(2) 
each of which is an enrichment of Mo with rn. If Mo=(A, ro, r1, ... , rn-1), 
then for each rn C enA, the system (A, ro, r1, ... , rn-1, rn) is an enrichment 
of M 0 with rn 9). In other words, there is a function U: on Sf(2) onto 
Sf(2"o) such that, if U:(M) =Mo, then M is an enrichment of M 0 with rn. 
However, the converse U: of U: is not a function on Sf(2"o) onto St(2) 
but a one-many relation with domain Sf(2"0 ) and counterdomain Sf(2). 
Let weo C 5r(2"o) be the class of all models of To and let we C St(2) 
be the class of all models of T. It can be seen easily that U: establishes 
a one-one correspondence between we and weo if, and only if, for any 
model Mo of T0 there exists one, and only one, enrichment M of M 0 
with rn such that M is a model of T. This remark enables us to rewrite 
theorem l' in the following formulation: 
Theorem 2: For T to be definable explicitly and validly from To 
it is necessary and sufficient that U: establishes a one-mae correspondence 
between we and weo. 
The theorems l, l' and 2 provide us with semantical definitions of 
the concept of explicit definability; semantical, because reference is 
made to the models of the theories concerned. Theorem 2 reveals more 
in particular the relationship between two classes of systems which 
corresponds with the relationship "being definable explicitly and validly 
from" between two theories of which these systems are the models. 
Next we want to introduce definability as a purely mathematical 
notion. 
Let M', M" E Sf(2). We say that M' and M" are elementarily equivalent 
if, and only if, every sentence a E I: which is true in M', is also true in M" 
(and conversely) 10). 
9 ) The notation BA denotes the set of functions with domain B and range in-
cluded in A. The natural number n is assumed to be identified with the set of all 
natural numbers smaller than n. Hence nA denotes the set of all n-termed sequences 
with terms in A. The notation BA, nA and such, instead of the more familiar AB, 
An and such, is proposed, e.g., by A. TARSKI in [12]. 
10) Instead of elementarily equivalent A. TARSKI uses also arithmetically equivalent. 
Cf. [10], part I, p. 577, footnote 5. 
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According to the theorem of KEISLER n) it is possible to characterize 
the notion of elementary equivalence in purely mathematical terms. 
KEISLER's result states that, assuming the generalized continuum hypo-
thesis, two structures are elementarily equivalent if, and only if, they 
have some isomorphic ultrapowers. We can make use of this result without 
going further into details. 
With help of KEISLER's theorem and theorem 2 it is possible to charac-
terize the notion of explicit definability in a purely mathematical way. 
This implies, of course, that this characterization pre-supposes the 
generalized continuum hypothesis. 
The suggestive link between the theorem of KEISLER and our theorem 2 
lies in the fact that the one-one correspondence established by ~ as in 
theorem 2 is an isomorphism preserving elementary equivalence. For this 
we argue as follows: if M', M" E ID1 are elementarily equivalent, tl}en it 
is trivial that Mo' =~(M') and ]Jfo" =~(M") are elementarily equivalent 
also. On the other hand, let Mo*, Mo** E IDeo and let Mo*, Mo** be 
elementarily equivalent; let Fo * C Eo be the set of all sentences true in 
M o *. Because of the elementary equivalence Fo * is also the set of all 
sentences true in Mo**. Furthermore, Fo* is complete as the set of all 
sentences true in a certain model. Obviously, Fo C Fo* and only in case Fo 
is complete we have Fo= Fo*. Let M* =~-l(Mo) and let M** =~-l(Mo**). 
Let F* C E be the set of all sentences true in M*. Since F is definable 
explicitly and validly from Fo there is some explicit definition c5 of rn 
in !l' such that F= Fo U { c5}, hence r C F* implies c5 E F*. Thus we 
have Fo* C F* and c5 E F*, and hence Fo* U {c5} C F*. Since Fo* is 
complete, Fo* U {c5} is complete also and so Fo* U {c5}=F*, theory F* 
being complete as the set of all sentences true in a certain model. In 
the same way we argue that Fo * U { c5} = F* *, where F* * is the set of 
all sentences true in M**. Therefore, F* = F** and M*, M** are elemen-
tarily equivalent. 
At this point of our considerations we start all over again, our point of 
departure this time being some arbitrary relational system 
N =(B, so, S1, .•. , Sm-1, Sm), where B is an arbitrary non-empty set and for 
each i such that O..;;;i..;;;m, Si is a finitary relation inB; more precisely, with 
each Si there is associated a natural number Vi and Si C 7'B, i.e., Si is a 
set of ordered Vi-tuples of elements of B; we speak of Vi as of the rank 
of Si. 
Let ~(N) be the class of all relational systems which are similar to N. 
In mathematical terms we can say that two relational systems are similar 
if, and only if, there is an isomorphism between the sets of their relations 
such that corresponding relations have the same rank. 
11) Cf. [6], pp. 477 ff. 
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Let SJC C Sj(N) be the class of all systems which are not only similar 
to N but also elementarily equivalent with N. Assuming the generalized 
continuum hypothesis sn can be characterized in purely mathematical 
terms according to the theorem of KEISLER. 
Let No=(B, s0, s1, ... , Srn-1) and let 9co be the class of all relational 
systems, which are not only similar to N 0, but also elementarily equivalent 
with No. 
Let 3' be the function which associates with each N' E 9c the relational 
system No' obtained from N' by dropping the relations' rn, i.e., the relation 
in N' which corresponds with Srn under the similarity mentioned above. 
It can be seen readily that for each N' E SJC the corresponding N 0' =,S'(N') 
is a member of SJC0• We then give the following purely mathematical 
definitions : 
Definition 3: The relational system N is definable explicitly from 
the relational system No=,S'(N) if, and only if, 3' establishes a one-one 
correspondence between sn and Sflo. 
Definition 4: The relation Srn is definable explicitly with respect to 
N if, and only if, N is definable explicitly from No=,S'(N). 
For the relational system N we can construct one standard language X 
such that N is a model suited to the language %. This language X is 
simply the formal language of first-order predicate logic with identity 
containing no other non-logical constants than the relation constants 
so, s1, .. . ,Sm-I,Sm, which have the ranks vo, v1, ... , Ym-b Yrn of so,s1, ... ,Sm-1,Srn 
respectively. 
Considering Sf(X) it is obvious that Sf(X) = Sj(N) and hence that 
SJC C Sf(%). Let E be the set of all sentences of% and let L1 C E be the 
set of all sentences which are true inN. The set of sentences L1 is a complete 
theory as the set of all sentences true in a certain model. Let Sfl* C Sf(f) 
be the class of all models of Ll. Because of the completeness of L1 every 
sentence ~ E E which is true in one element of SJC* is true in all elements 
of SJC*. Hence SJC* = SJC, since the latter is the class of all systems which 
are elementarily equivalent with N. 
Let Xo be the language obtained from% by dropping the predicate srn. 
Let Eo be the set of all sentences of % 0 and let Ll 0 =Ll n E0 • Obviously, 
Ll 0 is a complete theory also. Let Sflo* C Sf(Xo) be the class of all models 
of L1 0• Because of the completeness of L1 0 all elements ofSJC0* are elementarily 
equivalent. Since N is a model of L1 it is obvious that No is a model of 
Llo, or No E Sflo* and hence Sflo* =Sflo. 
Since Sfl*=Sfl and Sflo*=Sflo it may be obvious that the function~ in 
so far it plays a part in theorem 2 coincides with the function 3' in so 
far it plays a part in definition 3. Thus we have a bridge between theorem 2 
and definition 3: 
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Theorem 3: The relational system N is definable explicitly from the 
relational system No if, and only if, L1 is definable explicitly and validly 
from L1o. 
Because of definitions 4 and 2 we can ·write: 
Theorem 3': The relation Sm is definable explicitly with respect 
to N if, and only if, the predicate Bm is definable explicitly and validly 
with respect to L1. 
Not without reason we used in definition 1 the terminology "definable 
explicitly and validly". This is done in order to distinguish this definability 
from so-called compatible definability 12). The predicate rn is definable 
explicitly and compatibly with respect to r if, and only if, there is some 
explicit definition ~ of rn in 2 such that ~ is compatible with r, or what 
amounts to the same thing, such that r l:J { ~} is consistent. The ter-
minology "and validly" carries through theorem 3 and 3'. We want to 
remark, however, that for the sake of beauty and without any harm one 
could drop these words in the formulation of the theorems 3 and 3'. 
It so happens, that in these theorems the theory L1 is a complete theory 
and every sentence compatible with a complete theory is valid in it, 
and thus the distinction becomes irrelevant. 
In theorem 3' we have established the equivalence between the mathe-
matical notion of definability with respect to a mathematical system 
and the syntactical-logical notion of definability with respect to the 
complete theory corresponding with this mathematical system. 
The question arises what there can be said mathematically when 
syntactical-logical definability is questioned with respect to some arbitrary 
theory. In order to answer this question we have to switch back to the 
syntactical-logical side and we begin again at our original point of 
departure. 
Let 2 with ro, r1, ... , rn-1, rn be given as before and let first r C E 
be a consistent and complete theory. Assume that Fis definable explicitly 
and validly from Fo. Because of the consistency r has a model, say M, 
and the set of all sentences true in 1~1 coincides with r due to the comple-
teness of F. Hence, according to theorem 3, M is definable explicitly 
from Mo. 
Conversely, assume there is a model M' of Fwhich is definable explicitly 
from Mo'. Then, again because of theorem 3, r is definable explicitly 
and validly from F0• Next we assume only that r is complete. Let r be 
definable explicitly and validly from F0 and let M' be any model of r. 
Again we have that r coincides with all sentences true in M', and hence, 
by theorem 3, we have that M' is definable explicitly from Mo'. Conversely, 
12) Cf. [4], p. 2. 
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Jet every model M' of Fbe definable explicitly from 1Jfo'. If Fis consistent, 
then we have the previous case. If r is inconsistent, then clearly r is 
definable explicitly and validly from Fo. Thus we can state: 
Theorem 4: The consistent and complete theory r is definable 
explicitly (and validly) from Fo if, and only if, some model M of r is 
definable explicitly from Mo. The complete theory Fis definable explicitly 
(and validly) from Fo if, and only if, every model M' of r is definable 
explicitly from the corresponding Mo'. 
Theorem 4': The predicate rn is definable explicitly (and validly) 
with respect to the consistent and complete theory r if, and only if, for 
some model M of r the relation in M corresponding with the predicate 
rn is definable explicitly with respect to M. The predicate rn is definable 
explicitly (and validly) with respect to the complete theory r if, and 
only if, for every model M' of r the relation in M' corresponding with 
the predicate rn is definable explicitly with respect to M'. 
If, however, theory r is not complete, then the situation is different. 
Not all models of r are elementarily equivalent. Let us assume first 
that r is definable explicitly and validly (here we cannot omit these 
words) from F0• Then, every complete extension13) F* of r is definable 
explicitly (and validly) from Fo*, where Fo* = F* (")Eo. 
Hence, according to theorem 4, every model M* of F* is definable 
explicitly from the corresponding Mo*. However, there are no other 
models of r than those which are models of some F*. So we can state : 
Theorem 5: If a theory r is definable explicitly and validly from 
F0 , then every model M' of r is definable explicitly from Mo'. 
Theorem 5': If a predicate rn is definable explicitly and validly 
with respect to a theory r, then for every model M' of r the relation 
in JW corresponding with the predicate rn, is definable explicitly with 
respect to M'. 
Let us assume next that every model M' of r is definable explicitly 
and validly from Mo'. This implies, because of theorem 3, that every 
complete extension F* of r is definable explicitly and validly from Fo*. 
It does not follow, however, that r is definable explicitly and validly 
from F0• We shall say that r is definable explicitly and compatibly from Fo if, 
and only if, rn is definable explicitly and compatibly with respect to r. 
If every complete extension F* of r is definable explicitly and validly 
from Fo *, then two things are implied: 
(i) if Fis consistent, then Fis at least definable explicitly and compatibly 
from Fo; 
13) We say that F' is an extension of r if and only if r ~ F' ~ E. 
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(ii) if Tis not definable explicitly and validly from To, then there are 
at least two different explicit definitions of rn in 2 compatible 
with T. 
For the former point we remark that in case T is inconsistent, T is 
definable explicitly and validly from To without being definable explicitly 
and compatibly from To. 
For the latter point we have the following comments. If T is not 
definable explicitly and validly from To, then T is consistent. 
According to the theorem of LINDENBAUM14) T has a consistent and 
complete extension, say T*1. Since T*1 is definable explicitly and validly 
from To*1 there is at least one explicit definition, say !51, of rn in 2 
compatible with T. Since !51 is compatible with T without being valid in T, 
the negation of !51 is also compatible with T and T l:J {J1} is consistent and 
has a consistent and complete extension, say T*2, which obviously is 
different from T*1. Theory T*2 is in its turn definable explicitly and 
validly from T0*2. Hence, there is a second explicit definition of rn in 2, 
say !52, which is compatible with T. Since !52 is compatible with T l:J {J1} 
certainly !52 is different from !5115). We can summarize these facts in the 
following theorems: 
Theorem 6: If every model M' of a theory Tis definable explicitly 
from M o', then 
(i) every complete extension T* of T is definable explicitly and 
validly from To* ; 
(ii) if Tis consistent, then Tis at least definable exp1icitly and compatibly 
from To; 
(iii) if Tis not definable explicitly and validly from To, then there are 
at least two different explicit definitions of rn in 2 compatible 
with T. 
Theorem 6': If for every model M' of T the relation in M' cor-
responding with the predicate rn is definable explicitly with respect to 
M', then 
(i) the predicate rn is definable explicitly and validly with respect to 
every complete extension T* of T; 
(ii) if Tis consistent, then the predicate rn is at least definable explicitly 
and compatibly with respect to T; 
(iii) if the predicate rn is not definable explicitly and validly with 
respect to T, then there are at least two different explicit definitions 
of rn in 2 compatible with T. 
14) A. LINDENBAUM. Cf. [8], p. 34 of the English translation. A simple proof of 
the theorem can also be found in [3], pp. 209, 210. 
15) Let <h be compatible with rand let <52 be compatible with T. We say that 
<51 and <52 are different if, and only if, r U {.:51~.:52} is consistent. 
19 Series A 
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The next variety we have to consider is the case where r is an in-
complete theory, where r is not definable explicitly and validly from F0 , 
but where r is definable explicitly and compatibly from F0• What can 
there be said mathematically about this situation 1 Since there is at least 
one explicit definition ~ of rn in 2 such that r l:J { ~} is consistent, there 
is at least one complete extension F* of r such that F* is definable 
explicitly and validly from To*, and hence, according to theorem 4, 
there is at least one model M of r such that M is definable explicitly 
from Mo. Thus way we obtain: 
Theorem 7: If a theory r is definable explicitly and compatibly 
from To then there is at least one model M of Fwhich is definable explicitly 
from Mo. 
Theorem 7' : If the predicate rn is definable explicitly and com-
patibly with respect to a theory r, then there is at least one model M 
of Fsuch that the relation in M corresponding with rn is definable explicitly 
with respect to M. 
Conversely, if there is at least one model M of r which is definable 
explicitly from Mo, then r is at least definable explicitly and compatibly 
from F0• If, moreover, there is also a model M' of r which is not definable 
explicitly from Mo', then there is at least one extension F* of r which 
is not definable explicitly and validly from To* and hence r is not definable 
explicitly and validly from To 16). We express these facts as follows: 
Theorem 8: If there is at least one model M of a theory r such 
that M is definable explicitly from Mo, then r is definable explicitly and 
compatibly from To. {If, moreover, there is at least one model M' of r 
such that M' is not definable explicitly from Mo', then r is not definable 
explicitly and validly from To 16).) 
Theorem 8': If there is at least one model M of a theory r such 
that the relation in M corresponding with rn is definable explicitly with 
respect to M, then rn is definable explicitly and compatibly with respect 
to r. {If, moreover, there is at least one model M' of r such that the 
relation in M' corresponding with rn is not definable explicitly with 
respect to M', then the predicate rn is not definable explicitly and validly 
with respect to r 17).) 
Finally we arrive at the case that a theory r is not at all definable 
explicitly from To, neither validly nor compatibly. It follows from theorem 
8 that in this situation there cannot be a model M of r such that M is 
definable explicitly from Mo. Conversely, if there is no model M of r 
which is definable explicitly from M 0 , then r is not definable explicitly 
16) Cf. Theorem 5. 
17) Cf. Theorem 5'. The latter parts of the theorems 8 and 8' are repetitions in 
order to stress the case of compatible but not valid definability. 
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and compatibly from Fo because of theorem 7, and therefore r is certainly 
not definable explicitly and validly from Fo. Hence, we conclude with 
the theorems : 
Theorem 9: A theory F is not definable explicitly from Fo, neither 
validly nor compatibly, if, and only if, no model M of r is definable 
explicitly from Mo. 
Theorem 9': A predicate rn is not definable explicitly with respect 
to a theory r, neither validly nor compatibly, if, and only if, there is 
no model M of r such that the relation in M corresponding with rn is 
definable explicitly with respect to M. 
The negative formulation of the theorems 9, 9' is, of course, not essential 
but seems to stress the fact that all cases have been considered, 
Remark. Modified notions of the theory of definitions may fall 
under the considerations expounded above. R. MONTAGU:E 18) has pointed 
out applications to the following concept of definability: Let 
M =(A, r0, ••. , rn) be a model suited to the language .!l' and let r C mA. 
Then we say that r is definable in M if, and only if, there is a formula 
cp in .!l' such that: 
((i) the free variables of cp are among the first m variables; 
ii) for all ao, ... , am-1 E A the ordered sequence (ao, ... , am-1) satifies cp 
in M if, and only if, (ao, ... , am-1) E r. 
It can be seen readily that by theorem 3 the relation r is definable 
in M if, and only if, the relational system (A, ro, ... , rn, r) is definable 
explicitly from the relational system M, or, by theorem 3', if, and only if, 
the relation r is definable explicitly with respect to (A, r0, ••• , rn, r). 
Moreover, because of definitions 3 and 4, we can say then that r is definable 
in M if, and only if, for every relational system M' elementarily equivalent 
with M, there exists one, and only one, enrichment N' of M' with r such 
that N' is elementarily equivalent with (A, ro, ... , rn, r). 
18) In a talk on "Interpretability in terms of models" delivered at the University 
of Amsterdam on december 4, 1962. The author is indebted to Prof. R. MoNTAGUE 
of the University of California at Los Angeles who read the manuscript of this 
paper and encouraged its publication. 
University of Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam, October 1962 
REFERENCES 
I. BETH, E. W., On Padoa's method in the theory of definition. lndagationes 
Mathematicae, 15, 330 (1953). 
2. , L'existence en rnathematiques. Paris-Louvain, 1956. 
3. , The foundations of mathematics. Amsterdam, 1959. 
274 
4. BouvERE, K. L. DE, A method in proofs of undefinability. Amsterdam, 1959. 
5. KALISH, D. and R. MoNTAGUE, On Tarski's formalization of predicate logic with 
identity. To appear in Archiv fur mathematische Logilc und Grund-
lagenforschung. 
6. KEISLER, H. J., Ultraproducts and elementary classes. Indagationes Ma~he­
maticae, 23, 477 (1961). 
7. PADOA, A., Essai d'une theorie algebrique des nombres entiers, precede d'une 
introduction logique a une theorie deductive quelconque. In Biblio-
theque du Oongres International de Philosophie, 3, (1901). Paris, 1901, 
pp. 309 ff. 
8. TARSKI, A., Uber einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik. Oomptes 
Rendus des seances de la societe des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, 
23 cl. iii, 22 (1930). English translation: On some fundamental 
concepts of metamathematics. In Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 
papers from 1923 to 1938 by Alfred Tarslci, translated by J. H. Woodger. 
Oxford, 1956, pp. 30 ff. 
9. , Some notions and methods on the borderline of algebra and meta-
mathematics. In Proceedings of the International Oongres of Mathe-
maticians 1950, 1. Providence, R.I., 1952, pp. 705 ff. 
10. , Contributions to the theory of models. Parts I and II: Indagationes 
11. 
12. 
Mathematicae, 16, 572 (1954). Part III: ibidem, 17, 56 (1955). 
and R. L. VAUGHT: Arithmetical extensions of relational systems. 
Oompositio Mathematica, 13, 81 (1957). 
----, A simplified formalization of predicate logic with identity. To appear 
in Archiv fur mathematische Logilc und Grundlagenforschung. 
